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Agriculture in Maharashtra, as in some other
States of India, is largely dependent on the
vagaries of nature. Inadequate and uncertain rains
are a common, if not regular, feature in several of
its districts. This often leads to scarcity conditions.
The irrigation development in the State is much
below the national average. Only 6.8 per cent of
the State's cropped area was under irrigation as
against 20 per cent in the country in 1963/64'. A
primary aim of Governments has been to increase
this percentage. Their second, and equally import-
ant, means of promoting agricultural development
has been to provide credit, fertilizers, and market-
ing and processing facilities largely through the
establishment of a network of cooperatives. How-
ever, the creation of facilities in itself does not
produce the desired results. Some people respond
to the facilities positively, others do not.
Different social groups respond differently. Why
should this be so? Often, differential responses are
a result of the differing material conditions of the
groups and their perceptions of their own interests.
It is also, sometimes, a matter of values and atti-
tudes. Of course interests and attitudes are in-
terrelated and they often influence one another.2
This paper is about an example of such inter-
relation. It is a case study of agricultural develop-
ment in Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra and
discusses the responses of different caste groups to
the development process. I shall mainly concen-
trate on new opportunities created by the pro-
vision of irrigation facilities and the expansion of
cooperative activities.
In any discussion of rural society in India, the
importance of caste cannot be over-emphasized.
This does not mean that class analysis is unim-
portant or that class consciousness does not exist.
I shall, however, deal mainly in terms of caste
because I am concerned with differences among
people all of whom broadly belong to the same
class and who seem to act more as members of
particular castes. I am mainly concerned with
sugarcane growers who are economically better
1 Maharashtra 2969, Government of Mahaxashtra, aombay,
1969, p.91.
2 For a discussion on this, see André Béteille, "Ideas and
Interests: Some Conceptual Problems in the Study of Social
Stratification in Rural India", International Social Science
lournal, Vol. XXI No. 2, 1969, pp. 219-34.
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off than ordinary dry' farmers and agricultural
labourers.
Irrigation: the differential response
Although Ahmednagar district has a rich soil, it
often faced famine conditions due to uncertainty
of rains. Traditionally it was an area of subsistence
farming and 94 per cent of its land was used for
grain crops such as bajra, jowar, pulses and oil-
seeds. Cash crops such as sugarcane or cotton
were almost non-existent. A large number of
peasants were heavily indebted to moneylenders
a majority of whom were Marwari and Gujarati
traders. The exploitation of the peasants by the
moneylenders resulted in peasant riots against the
moneylenders in the early 1870s. The riots were
concentrated in parts of Ahmednagar and some
of the neighbouring districts. This led to the
appointment of the Deccan Riots Commission of
1875. Following the recommendations of the Com-
mission, the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act of
1879 was passed to alleviate the condition of the
agriculturists affected by the moneylenders' acti-
vities.
The latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed
frequent famines in the area due to failure of
rains. There was a serious famine in 1877 fol-
lowed by drought conditions in subsequent years.
A large number of local people had to migrate to
the neighbouring district of Khandesh in search
of food and employment. They made up over 18
per cent of the district's population during 1891-
190l. This led to the appointment of the Famine
Commission of 1901 and the Irrigation Com-
mission of 1903. Both the Commissions recom-
mended the creation of irrigation facilities to
improve the economic lot of the agriculturists. The
Deccan Riots Commission and the Famine Com-
mission had also recommended provision of easy
and cheap credit to the peasants.
The first major step in the development of the
area was the construction of irrigation canals on
the Godavari and Pravara rivers in 1911 and 1920
respectively. The canals supplied water to irrigate
nearly 100,000 acres of land in Kopargaon,
Shrirampur and Rahuri talukas of the district.
Initially the canal water was supplied at a very
3 Government of India, Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 5,
New Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1908, pp.114, 119,
397 if.
cheap rate, but the farmers were found to be
reluctant to utilize it.4 The big investment in the
construction of the dams, reservoirs and canals
thus appeared to be wasted.
Who were the local peasants and why were they
apathetic to the new opportunity which was
created especially for their benefit? As in other
parts of Maharashtra, the Marathas enjoy the
dominant position among the cultivating caste
groups in the area. They are numerically prepon-
derant and own and cultivate the bulk of the land.
Traditionally they also enjoy political power as
the office of village headman was often occupied
by a Maratha on a hereditary basis. There were
other cultivating castes locally known as Karekars,
Vanjaris and Dhangars who were numerically
small, enjoyed slightly lower ritual status and did
not have access to the office of village headman.
The Marathas and the others did not come for-
ward to utilize the canal waters for a number of
reasons. First, they had no experience and skill in
irrigation farming. Second, they did not have
the necessary capital resources to raise irrigated
crops which required greater expenditure. They
had been impoverished due to successive failure
of crops and many of them were still overbur-
dened by debts. Third, there was a widespread
belief that regular use of canal water reduced the
fertility of the soil. Fourth, initially the lack of
proper drainage systems in the canal area led to
waterlogging which scared the cultivators.
The availability of canal waters in the area attrac-
ted a group of farmers belonging to the Mali
caste from the neighbouring Poona district. In-
itially about a hundred Mali families came to the
area, took land on lease from the local landowners
and started cultivating sugarcane. The Maus were
attracted by easy availability of land and canal
water at relatively cheap rates. Traditionally they
were cultivators of irrigated crops. In their home
district they cultivated vegetables and sold their
produce in the Poona city market. Some of them
engaged in small trading. They bought vegetables
in the surrounding villages and sold these in the
city market at a profit. Thus they were econo-
mically in a better position than the local culti-
vators. As they faced pressure on land in their
own area, they migrated to other areas whenever
they found opportunities of cultivating irrigated
lands. For example, when the Nira canals were
constructed in the Baramati area in 1898, some
Mali families settled along those canals. Similarly
some of them went to Bawda area in 1903 when
canal water became available there. Later they
4 Henry Orenstein has also reported the initial reluctance of
the farmers in Poona district to utilize canal Waters for
irrigation. See his Gaon: Conflict and Cohesion in an Indian
Village, Princeton University Press, 1967, p.237.
migrated to Sholapur district when similar oppor-
tunities emerged there. Thus the Malis had the
necessary experience and skills to cultivate irri-
gated lands; they had experience of marketing;
they had better financial resources to undertake
cultivation of cash crops; and they were forced
to look for new opportunities due to pressure on
land in their own area. Moreover, they had a
tradition of migrating to new areas in search of
irrigated lands. They were innovators and entre-
preneurs by culture in the sense that they had
the necessary tradition.
The local landowners, mostly Marathas but some
others as well, were content to give their lands
to Malis on a low rent. The poorer among them
sometimes worked as wage labourers for the
Malis. The Malis were commercial farmers (as
opposed to the local subsistence farmers) in a
true sense. They maintained detailed accounts of
their farm operations and called it a dhanda
(business). Since the lands they cultivated were
taken on lease (it was not ancestral property) and
they had come to the area to make money, they
developed 'business' attitudes towards agriculture.
Unlike the local cultivators who lived in villages,
the Malis preferred to live in vastis (farm houses)
with their farm labourers which enabled them to
supervise their farm work more regularly and
closely. The canal water often reached the indivi-
dual farms during the night and living on the farm
made it easier to irrigate the land under close
supervision. If they obtained better lands on lease
at another location, they shifted their vastis to the
new place. Thus they were not attached to any
village locality but to their farming business. The
Maus cultivated sugarcane, processed it into gur
(jaggery) and sold it in the markets at the neigh-
bouring towns. In the course of time, many of
them became rich and some of them bought the
lands which they had obtained on lease. The suc-
cess of the earlier migrants attracted more Malis
and during a period of twenty years nearly 400
Mali families came to the area. The Malis could
be called the pioneers of commercial farming in
the area.
The first factories
Meanwhile the local Marathas and other culti-
vating castes also learnt sugarcane growing al-
though initially they could not attain the same
proficiency as that of the Maus. There was an
overall expansion in sugarcane cultivation. How-
ever it did not last very long. The boom following
the First World War was over and the depression
came with a fall in gur prices. The Government
found that the canal water was not fully utilized.
This led to the appointment of the Deccan Canals
Financial Improvements Committee in 1932. The
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Committee recommended encouragement of sugar-
cane cultivation in the canal areas through the
establishment of sugar factories by offering poten-
tial entrepreneurs certain facilities and concessions
in securing lands on lease, fixation of rents, and
the supply of canal water at a cheap rate. In res-
ponse to these concessions, half a dozen sugar
factories were established during the thirties. These
factories were joint stock companies controlled by
industrialists from Bombay. They had their own
sugarcane farms on the lands leased from the
local landowners. In addition, they bought cane
from local growers including the Malis.
The canegrowers now had two alternatives. They
could either process their cane into gur or supply
it to the factories. Both the alternatives were far
from satisfactory. The gur prices were subject to
great fluctuations and the producers often suffered
severe losses. The factory owners exploited the
canegrowers in several ways. At times they re-
fused to buy the cane; they cheated in weighing;
they did not offer reasonable prices; and generally
they delayed payment. There was a need to pro-
vide a stable market and remunerative prices to
the canegrowers. This resulted in the establish-
ment of cooperative sugar factories and the ex-
pansion of the cooperative sector.
Development of cooperatives
Although the Cooperative Societies Act was passed
as early as in 1904, cooperatives were established
in the area in significant numbers only after 1920
to provide credit to the sugarcane-growers. It was
soon realized that providing credit was not enough.
The canegrowers had to depend upon local
Marwari and Gujarati traders for buying ferti-
lizers and other inputs and for selling their gur.
In order to help canegrowers in this respect, the
Cooperative Sale and Purchase Union (CSPU)
was established in 1932. The CSPU supplied ferti-
lizers and other inputs to its members and helped
in marketing their gur. While the Marathas
joined cooperatives in large numbers, the Malis,
Karekars and other minority castes hesitated to
do so. The cooperatives were managed by elected
committees and each member, irrespective of his
economic position, had only one vote. Since the
Marathas outnumbered other castes, the latter
feared that the cooperatives would be dominated
by the Marathas which would strengthen their
position vis-à-vis others. The Maus found a way
out by forming the Big Bagaitdar Cooperative
Societies.5 Most of the Karekars, for fear of
5 Bagaitdar means cultivator of irrigated lands. The sugarcane
growers are often caøed bagaitdars. The membership of the
Big Bsgaitdar Societies was restricted to those who cultivated
ten or more acres of cane. As most of the Maus were big
cane growers, they managed to keep a control over these
societies by keeping out a large number cf small Maratha
bagaitdars.
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Maratha domination, kept themselves aloof from
cooperatives and continued to depend on the
Marwari and Gujarati traders for their needs.
While the arrival of the canal waters created
cleavages between the Maus and other outsiders
on the one hand, and the Marathas and other
local caste groups on the other, the cooperatives
led to the cleavages between the Marathas on the
one hand and the minority castes on the other.
The Marathas resented the fact that the Malls,
who were outsiders, came to their area and be-
came rich by exploiting their lands and canal
water. Some Maratha leaders launched a campaign
against the Maus, persuading people not to give
their lands to them on lease and pressurizing the
Government to give a preference to local farmers
in the distribution of canal waters. It was generally
felt that the canals and the sugar factories had not
really helped the local people. The Malls, as the
pioneers, had reaped the greatest benefit. Later the
sugar factories, again owned by outsiders, had
made profits at the cost of sugarcane-growers. In
1948, Ganpatrao Autade, a rich Maratha cane-
grower, with the help of some eminent coperators
and 'ncouragement from the Government, in-
itiated a move to establish a cooperative sugar
factory to provide a stable and remunerative
return on sugarcane and to escape exploitation by
the private factory owners. While the Marathas
welcomed the proposal, he encountered opposi-
tion from others. The private factory owners
opposed it because it wculd adversely affect the
supply of cane to their own factories. They would
no longer be able to buy cane on their own
terms as they had been doing so far. The
Gujarati and Marwari traders opposed it because
it would threaten their trade in gur. The minority
castes such as the Malis and Karekars were
against it for fear of Maratha domination in
the new factory. As 'business-orientated' sugar-
cane growers, the Malis realized the economic
advantages of having a sugar factory. Some of
their kinsmen had successfully established a
factory of their own in Sholapur district and
they had personal knowledge of the benefits from
the factory. Their opposition emerged from a
sense of insecurity being outsiders and a minority.
They feared that the new factories would
strengthen the position of the Marathas who might
use their new power to threaten the economic
position of the Malis.
The new proposal required both share capital and
an adequate acreage of cane with the shareholders.
The Maus had both. They were bigger cane
growers and also possessed resources to buy
shares. But the indifference and, to some extent,
hostility on the part of the Maus and other
minority castes frustrated Autade. He had to give
the Co-operative sugar factory in Maharaslitra. Photographer: Margaret Murray. 25
up the idea of starting a sugar cooperative and
return whatever money he had collected from the
people.
Autade made another attempt in 1951, and this
time he succeeded. In order to allay the suspicions
of the trading and other minority castes, he per-
suaded a local Marwari trader to become one
of the promoters of the factory. Two Mali
leaders were made members of the first nominated
board of directors which worked for three years
from 1953 to 1956. After 1956, when the elected
directors took over, for about four years, three
seats on the board were reserved for those share-
holders who held shares worth more than ten
thousand rupees and supplied more than 10 acres
of cane. This, to some extent, ensured the election
of big shareholders who belonged to the minority
castes. Two announcements by the government
also helped the promoters: first, the policy of
favouring the licensing of sugar factories in the
cooperative sector and, second, the policy of dis-
allowing the sugarcane growers in the canal-
irrigated areas to cultivate more than six acres of
cane. However, those who joined a cooperative
sugar factory were to be exempted from this rule
and allowed to cultivate up to 25 acres of cane.
As most of the Malls were big cane growers, they
saw the threat to their cane growing operations
and joined the factory as shareholders without
delay. Thus Autade and his fellow promoters
succeeded in collecting enough share capital and
the factory was soon erected and went into pro-
duction in 1956.
The factory helped the sugarcane growers improve
their economic position by providing a regular
and attractive return for their produce. It also
helped them to increase their cane yield per acre
through its extension services. Sugarcane growers
in different parts of the district and the State
started demanding more cooperative sugar fac-
tories. In a period of less than 10 years, eight
more factories were established in the district and
more than 30 appeared in other districts. The
factories brought about a significant transforma-
tion in the social, economic and political life in
the rural areas. As they developed, the coopera-
tives in other fields, such as credit and marketing,
also developed, mutually strengthening one
another. Ahmednagar district soon became a
major area of sugarcane cultivation and sugar
production. It also acquired a reputation for
successful cooperative activities.
The cooperatives did strengthen the position of
the Marathas vis-à-vis the other castes. With the
advantage of their numerical strength and their
links with the Government and the ruling Con-
gress party, they acquired a decisive contro! over
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the cooperatives which in turn helped them to im-
prove their economic position. The Malls and
other minority castes resent the fact that the
Marathas have acquired so much power through
their control over cooperatives.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis shows how the different
caste groups perceived their interests and how
their interests and attitudes influenced their ability
to exploit the new opportunities. The events fol-
lowing the construction of irrigation canals bring
out the significance of cultural factors such as
experience and skills in irrigated farming, access
to capital resources, ability to change over from
subsistence to commerical farming, and willing-
ness to migrate from one area to another in search
of better opportunities. Since the Malis were in
a favourable position in these respects, they were
the first to benefit most from the canals. Of
course, in the course of time, the local Marathas
and others also acquired the necessary skills andjoined in the process of commercial farming.
But the role of the Malis as the initiators of this
process cannot be ignored. The Malis were helped
by their favourable attitudes in this process.
In the development of cooperative sugar factories
and other cooperative ventures, the Marathas
were enthusiastic but the Malis and other minority
castes were not. Here the hesitation on the part of
the minority castes resulted not from economic
but political considerations. As successful com-
mercial farmers they realized the economic bene-
fits of starting a sugar factory, but they were
apprehensive of its effect on the relative balance
of power among the different caste groups. But
they could not stop the expansion of cooperatives
and the consequent political advantage gained by
the Marathas. The cooperatives helped the
Marathas to improve their economic position.
In the constellation of forces favouring the crea-
tion of cooperatives, both the big grower/small
grower/merchant class division, and caste group
identification had an effect, but these interests, to
a great extent, coincided with caste divisions and
were articulated, at least by the minority castes,
in caste terms.
The process of agricultural development described
above brings out the role of social and cultural
factors in the response to new economic oppor-
tunities. Like all other case studies, this one also
cannot lead to any universal generalizations, but
it is hoped that it contributes, to some extent, to
our understanding of the process of agricultural
development in India and, perhaps, in some other
parts of south Asia.6
6 I am grateful to Michael Lipton for his valuable comments
and suggestions on the earlier draft of this paper.
